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Lanham Act Does Not
Require Proof of
Actual Confusion if
Advertisement Contains
Factually False
Statements

In Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
987 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1993), the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that facially untrue advertising violates § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1992), whether
or not consumers were actually
misled or confused. Additionally,
the court held that the First Amendment affords no protection for commercial speech containing false
claims.

Pennzoil's Advertisements and the
Lanham Act
Castrol Inc. ("Castrol") sued
Pennzoil Co. ("Pennzoil") in a New
Jersey United States District Court,
alleging that Pennzoil made false representations in its advertisements. Specifically, Castrol claimed that Pennzoil's
assertions that Pennzoil motor oil outperformed other leading brands in viscosity breakdown and engine protection were false. Castrol contended that
these claims violated § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, which prohibits false advertising through false or misleading
representations of fact.
The district court found that
Pennzoil's claims were "literally false,"
and permanently enjoined Pennzoil from
broadcasting the false advertisements
or any revised or reformulated version
thereof. Pennzoil appealed, asserting
that: (1) its advertisements did not
contain false claims; (2) Castrol failed
to prove the consumer confusion necessary to prevail under the Lanham
Act; and (3) the district court's injunc126

ae

tion violated Pennzoil's right to free
speech under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

Motor Oil Viscosity Tests
On appeal, the Third Circuit first
noted that the automotive industry
developed two primary tests for
measuring the quality of a motor oil:
the Shear Stability or Stay-in-Grade
test, and the High Temperature/High
Shear ("HTHS") test. The Stay-inGrade test requires that a motor oil
maintain a minimum viscosity after
testing. The HTHS test, in contrast,
measures an oil's reduced viscosity
after exposure to high temperatures
and high shear forces. The court stated
that at trial, both parties agreed that
Pennzoil did not outperform Castrol in
the Stay-in-Grade test. Furthermore,
the court found that Castrol's oils
actually outperformed Pennzoil's with
respect to the HTHS test.
Pennzoil, however, relied on a third
test promulgated by the American Society for Testing and Materials
("ASTM"), the ASTM D-3945 test, to
substantiate its claims of superior protection against viscosity breakdown.
The ASTM D-3945 test measures the
percentage of the loss of the oil's initial
viscosity. Pennzoil asserted that under
this test, its motor oil suffered less
viscosity loss percentage than Castrol's
product. Therefore, Pennzoil concluded
that these results supported its advertising claims.
The court, however, disagreed with
the applicability of the ASTM D-3945
test. The court noted that expert testimony concluded that the ASTM D3945 test merely measures the quality
of different batches of a manufacturer's
oil, and that the test cannot be used to
compare oils consisting of different
polymers. Since the oil produced by
Pennzoil and Castrol consisted of different polymers, the court held that the
ASTM D-3945 test was not a true
measure of viscosity breakdown. Ac-

cordingly, the court found Pennzoil's
claims untrue.

Advertisements Violate the Lanham
Act if False or Misleading
Pennzoil also argued that Castrol's
failure to show that consumers were
actually confused or misled by
Pennzoil's advertising should result in
a judgment for Pennzoil. In support,
Pennzoil cited Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.,
902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990), in which
the Third Circuit required proof of
actual consumer deception for a Lanham
Act claim. Pennzoil further asserted
that Sandoz required proof not only of
literally false advertisements, but also
of actual consumer deception.
The court, however, stated that
Sandoz resorted to proof of consumer
confusion only after it had found that
the advertising claims were not literally false. This differed from
Pennzoil's case, because the trial court
found Pennzoil's advertisements to be
literally false. Additionally, the court
stated that according to Johnson &
Johnson v. GAC International,Inc.,
862 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1988), a party
may recover if the advertisement is
either: (1) false on its face; or (2)
literally true, but nevertheless likely,
in the merchandising context, to mislead and confuse consumers. Therefore, the court held that Castrol could
recover against Pennzoil even without
showing consumer confusion because
it proved that Pennzoil's advertisements were literally false.
Pennzoil's Asserts Falsity Not
Proven
Pennzoil, however, argued that
Castrol failed to prove its advertising
claims were literally false. Pennzoil
contended that Castrol never offered
proof to refute Pennzoil's claims, but
merely cast doubt on Pennzoil's research. Pennzoil asserted that this
circumvented the general principle that
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in Lanham Act cases, a claimant claiming false advertising of product superiority must affirmatively prove that the
product is equal or inferior in order to
prevail.
The court acknowledged that Castrol
was required to affirmatively prove
that Pennzoil's product was equal or
inferior, but held that Castrol had sustained this burden of proof. The court
noted that Castrol had tested both its
products and Pennzoil' s under the Stayin-Grade and HTHS standards. Both
Pennzoil and Castrol met the Stay-inGrade requirements. However, while
all Castrol motor oils and most Pennzoil
motor oils met the HTHS standards,
Pennzoil's 5W-30 and 1OW-30 oils
failed to pass this test. Therefore, the
court held that Castrol had adequately
proven that Pennzoil's products were
equal, or in some cases inferior, to
Castrol's motor oils.
Moreover, the court found that
Castrol had properly discredited the
evidence with which Pennzoil sought
to substantiate its viscosity breakdown
claim. Pennzoil based its claim on the
fact that its motor oils had suffered less
viscosity loss percentage than Castrol
oils in the ASTM D-3945 test. However, Castrol proved that the ASTM D3945 test was never intended to compare the viscosity breakdown of oils of
different polymer classes, and could
not perform this function accurately.
Since Pennzoil and Castrol are oils of
different polymer classes, the court
held that Pennzoil's advertising claims
were literally false.
Pennzoil'sClaim to Better Engine
ProtectionFalse by Implication
Pennzoil next contended that the
district court erred in deciding that its
claims of superior engine protection
were false by necessary implication.
The appellate court, however, disagreed
with this contention. The court noted
that Pennzoil's advertisements claimed,
although falsely, that Pennzoil outperforms any leading motor oil against
viscosity breakdown. Pennzoil also
claimed that viscosity breakdown led
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to engine failure and that Pennzoil
provided better protection against engine failure. This left consumers with
the necessary implication that Pennzoil
protected better against engine failure
because it outperformed any leading
motor oil against viscosity breakdown.
Having found the viscosity breakdown
claim to be literally false, the court
ruled that the engine failure claim must
also be false by necessary implication.
False Speech Not ProtectedBy The
FirstAmendment
Pennzoil argued that the district
court's injunction violated Pennzoil's
right to free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pennzoil contended that the
order would prohibit Pennzoil from
claiming that its motor oils provided
superior protection against viscosity
breakdown at any time in the future.
Thus, even if Pennzoil improved its
product so that the prohibited statement became true, it would still be
barred from stating this truth. Therefore, Pennzoil argued that the injunction was an unconstitutional restraint
on its free speech.
The court rejected this argument,
holding that the First Amendment does
not protect false commercial speech.
The court stated that Pennzoil's claim
that its motor oils provided better protection against viscosity breakdown was
false at the present time and therefore
was not protected by the First Amendment. The court suggested that Pennzoil
could apply for a modification of the
injunction if its viscosity breakdown
claim became true at some later date.
Dissent Urges that Consumer Survey
Evidence Crucial
The dissent argued that both the
majority and the district court improperly ignored the consumer survey evidence presented by Pennzoil. It noted
that Pennzoil had introduced a consumer survey which purported to demonstrate that consumers largely ignored
Pennzoil's claims of superior engine
protection and greater protection against

viscosity breakdown. The dissent urged
that because the Lanham Act was intended to provide a private remedy to a
commercial plaintiff whose commercial interests have been harmed by a
competitor's false advertising, the critical question was not the content of the
advertisement, but the message it conveyed to consumers. **.
-
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Students Enrolled in NonAccredited Course Not
Aggrieved Consumers
In Finstad v. Washburn Univ. of
Topeka, 845 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1993),
the Kansas Supreme Court held that
students who were not aggrieved consumers as defined by the Kansas Consumer Protection Act could not sue to
recover damages from enrolling in nonaccredited courses. Additionally, the
court found that no legally recognizable claim for education malpractice
exists.
False Statement of Accreditation
Washburn University of Topeka
("Washburn") began offering a court
reporting program in 1984. In 1985,
the University hired Debra Smith
("Smith"), a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Registered Professional
Reporter, as the instructor for this new
program. Until 1989, Smith's students
judged her satisfactorily in instructor
evaluations. However, in the fall of
1989, students began complaining about
poor instruction in the court reporting
program. As a result, Washburn undertook remedial measures against
Smith, who subsequently resigned in
the spring of 1990.
At the commencement of the court
reporting program in 1984, Washburn
sought course accreditation from the
National Shorthand Reporters Asso-

